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Abstract
We characterize choice rules for schools that regard students as substitutes, while
at the same time expressing preferences for the diversity composition of the student
body. The stable (or fair) assignment of students to schools requires the latter to regard
the former as substitutes. Such a requirement is in conflict with the reality of schools’
preferences for a diverse student body. We show that the conflict can be useful, in the
sense that certain unique rules emerge from imposing both considerations.
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How to control controlled school choice∗
Federico Echenique M. Bumin Yenmez
. . . controlled choice provides local officials with a final student assignment
policy that maximizes family choice and effective desegregation outcomes on a
districtwide basis, provides stability of assignment . . . , and makes all schools
and programs available to students of diverse racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic
backgrounds (Alves and Willie, 1987, Page 75).
1 Introduction
Recent reforms in school choice programs seek to install a stable (or fair) assignment of
students to schools (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003; Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, Roth,
and So¨nmez, 2005). This objective is severely compromised by school districts’ concerns
for diversity. Under diversity considerations, a stable assignment may not exist, and
the mechanisms used in reformed school districts may not work. There is in fact a
very basic tension between diversity considerations and the assumptions required in the
theory of stable matching: diversity concerns will introduce complementarities in schools’
preferences; the theory requires substitutability.
If a school is concerned with gender balance, for example, then it may admit a
mediocre male applicant only because it allows the school to admit an excellent female
applicant, while maintaining gender balance. The two students are thus complements,
not substitutes, for the school. Complementarities in the school’s choices of students are
a problem because the theory, and the mechanism proposed in school choice programs,
require that students are substitutes in schools’ choices. We are far from the first to
∗We thank Estelle Cantillon for her helpful comments, as well as seminar audiences at MIT/Harvard,
ECARES, Sciences-Po, University of Arizona, University of California-Davis, University of California-
Irvine, University of Montreal.
recognize this problem: Section 1.1 below discusses the relevant literature. The idea that
diversity clashes with stability is very easy to recognize; in Section 1.2 we present a par-
ticularly simple example of the incompatibility between stability and diversity concerns.
Our paper seeks to reconcile diversity with the objective of seeking a stable matching
of students to schools. We characterize the schools’ choices that are compatible with both
diversity considerations and the theory of stable matchings. There is so much tension
between substitutability and diversity that one might think no choice rule can satisfy
both. We prove that this does not need to be the case: We study the choices that satisfy
certain normative axioms, one of them being substitutability, and show how combinations
of axioms give rise to unique choice procedures, some of which are already implemented
in practice. Our procedures allow schools to express concerns for diversity, while allowing
the standard mechanism (the one used in the school choice programs guided by stable
matching theory) to install a stable assignment of students to schools.1
We assume that students belong to one of multiple types. Types could be categories
of gender, socioeconomic status, race or ethnicity. In all our results, there is an “ideal”
or “target” distribution that plays a crucial role. For example, we axiomatize a rule
that tries to minimize the (Euclidean) distance between the distribution over types in
the student body, and some ideal distribution over types (see Section 4). A common
consideration is that each school should have a share of White, Black, Hispanic, etc.
children that matches, as close as possible, the distribution of races and ethnicities in the
relevant population (Alves and Willie, 1987). Our rule operationalizes this consideration,
where the population distribution is the ideal to be reached for. The axiomatization tells
us what such a rule means, in terms of normative qualitative criteria.
In two other rules, the school reserves a number of seats for each type of students (hard
and soft quotas, see Section 5). The number of seats reserved for each type is related
to the target distribution over types. Yet another rule (Section 4) seeks to maximize a
measure of diversity (for example the Theil measure of diversity, see Theil (1967); Foster
and Sen (1997)); the target distribution enters as a parameter in the measure of diversity.
In Section 3 we give a brief overview of these rules and the corresponding axioms. The
point of these results is that the rules result uniquely from the normative considerations
1We do not propose any new mechanisms: we want a theory that will work with the mechanisms that
have already been accepted and adopted by multiple school districts. Indeed, these mechanisms have
been accepted across many different market design problems (Roth, 2008), not only in the assignment
of students to schools.
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underlying our axioms.
We imagine that a school district can discuss a menu of axioms, and settle on the
axioms that it deems most desirable. Basically, schools have given priorities, “prefer-
ences,” over individual students. These priorities can result from test scores, or from the
distance of the student’s residence to the school and other objective criteria. The school
also has preferences over the type composition of the student body: these preferences
come from concerns over diversity. Now, the school or the district may combine these two
preferences in different ways. Our results give recommendations on how the combination
should be carried out so that the standard mechanism in matching theory will work. If
a school, or a district, agrees on a set of axioms, then there will be a unique way of
combining priorities and diversity preferences into a choice procedure for the school. In
fact, as we explain in Sections 7 and 8, our rules are already similar to policies being
implemented around the world.
In Section 3 we provide a discussion of the axioms that we use, and an overview of
our results. In Sections 4-5 we present our characterization results. In Sections 7 and 8
we discuss actual implementations of affirmative action policies.
1.1 Related literature
Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003) introduced matching theory as a tool in school choice
and noted the problem with diversity concerns. Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003)
already raise the issue of diversity; they offer a solution based on hard quotas, one of the
models we axiomatize below.
The last two years have seen multiple explorations into controlled school choice and
diversity concerns. Kojima (2010) shows that affirmative action policies based on ma-
jority quotas may hurt minority students. To overcome this difficulty, Hafalir, Yen-
mez, and Yildirim (2011) propose affirmative action based on minority reserves. They
show that the outcome of the deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) with minority reserves
Pareto dominates DA with majority quotas. More generally, Ehlers, Hafalir, Yenmez,
and Yildirim (2011) study affirmative action policies when there are both type-specific
upper and lower bounds. They propose solutions based on whether the bounds are hard
or soft. In contrast, our paper seeks to endogenize the rules and consider (possibly) all
of them. Part of our research deals with the results uncovered by Hafalir, Yenmez, and
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Yildirim (2011). There are other papers that consider specific choice rules (Westkamp,
2010; Kominers and So¨nmez, 2012; Erdil and Kumano, 2012).
In contrast with the other papers in the literature, our focus is not on the market as
a whole, but rather on the preferences or choices of individual schools. We imagine the
mechanism is fixed (the deferred acceptance mechanism), and that we can design schools’
choices to satisfy certain normative axioms.
We focus on school preferences, but student preferences may also induce problems:
for example students may care about their colleagues. These problems are treated in
Echenique and Yenmez (2007) and Pycia (2012); they are outside the scope of the present
analysis. We focus here on diversity, and the effects of diversity on standard stable
matching theory. Our exercise pins down reasonable circumstances in which schools may
be concerned about diversity, and where the theory still remains useful because schools
satisfy gross substitutes.
1.2 Motivating example
In this example, we demonstrate the basic conflict between diversity concerns and the
gross substitutes. Suppose that there are two schools, c1 and c2, and two students, s1
and s2. Students are of different “type.” For example, s1 and s2 could be of different
gender, race or ethnicity.
School c1 can admit two students, but it is constrained to mimic the population
representation of each type. So it must admit either both students or none. School c2
has a single empty seat. It prefers to admit student s1 over student s2.
The students have preferences over schools as well: s1 prefers c1 over c2, while s2’s
favorite school is c2. The table below summarizes the agents’ preferences.
c1 c2 s1 s2
{s1, s2} s1 c1 c2
s2 c2 c1
Now it is easy to see that no assignment of students to schools is fair, or stable. For
example, if both students are assigned to school c1 then s2 might ask for the empty slot
in school c2. School c2 finds s2 acceptable, so the pair (c2, s2) can “block” this assignment
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(equivalently, s2’s claim to the empty seat is “justified”). Similarly, if s2 is assigned to
c2 then s1 would have no place, as school c1 cannot admit an unbalanced student body.
Then s1 would claim s2’s spot in school c2. Since s1 has a higher priority than s2 at
that school, (c2, s1) can “block” this assignment (or s1’s claim is “justified”) and thus
the assignment of s2 to c2 is unfair. Finally, if s1 is assigned to school c2 and s2 is
unassigned, then both students would prefer school c1, and school c1 prefers to get both
of them. Therefore, (c1, {s1, s2}) can block the assignment.
Thus, there exists no stable or fair assignment of students to schools in this exam-
ple. The intuition is that c1’s preferences for diversity cause complementarities between
students that make it impossible to have a stable assignment.
2 Model
2.1 Notational conventions
For any vector x ∈ Zd+, let ||x|| ≡
∑d
i=1 xi be the sum of its coordinates. For any x, y ∈
Zd+, let x∧y ≡ (min{x1, y1}, . . . ,min{xd, yd}) and x∨y ≡ (max{x1, y1}, . . . ,max{xd, yd})
be the infimum and supremum of x and y, respectively. For a finite set A, |A| denotes
the cardinality of A.
2.2 Schools’ admissions choices
We consider the admissions choices of an individual school or college. A school’s admis-
sions policy is described by a choice rule that determines which students to admit from
a pool of applicants. Our model is therefore one of the most basic models in microe-
conomics: see for example Moulin (1991), or Chapter 2 in Mas-Colell, Whinston, and
Green (1995). Later in the paper we study the market-wide implications of our results.
Let S be a nonempty finite set: the set of all students . A choice rule is a function
C : 2S \ {∅} → 2S such that C(S) is a subset of S, for all S ⊆ S. The interpretation of
C is that, if a school had the ability to admit its students out of the set S of students,
then it would choose C(S) to be its student body.
We shall assume that there is a positive number q such that |C(S)| ≤ q for all S ⊆ S.
The number q is the capacity of the school: the number of available seats that it has.
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The set of students S is partitioned into students of different “types,” these can be
based on gender, socioeconomic factors, or race and ethnicity. Formally, there exists a
set T ≡ {t1, . . . , td} of types , and a type function τ : S → T ; τ(s) is the type of student
s. Let St be the set of type-t students, i.e., St ≡ {s ∈ S : τ(s) = t}. Similarly, for any
set of students S ⊆ S, let St ≡ S ∩ St.
We use a function ξ : P(S)→ Zd+ to describe how many students of each type a given
set of students has. More formally, let
ξ(S) ≡ (|St1 |, . . . , |Std |) ∈ Zd+,
which consists of the number of students of each type in S. We term ξ(S) the distribu-
tion of students in S.
We assume that the school is not large enough that it could admit all students of a
given type: q ≤ |St| for all t ∈ T .2
3 Characterizations of choice rules: Overview
We shall define the main substantive axioms in our study, and give an overview of our
results.
The main axiom that we are interested in is the following:
Axiom 1. Choice rule C satisfies gross substitutes (GS) if s ∈ S ⊆ S ′ and s ∈ C(S ′)
imply that s ∈ C(S).
Gross substitutes requires that a student chosen from a set S ′ must also be chosen
from a subset of S ⊆ S ′ if the student is a member of the subset. Gross substitutes
was first studied by Kelso and Crawford (1982) and Roth (1984): It is sufficient for
the existence of stable matchings and for the Gale-Shapley algorithm to find a stable
matching. It is also in some sense necessary for these properties to hold (Hatfield and
Milgrom, 2005; Hatfield and Kojima, 2008).3
We impose gross substitutes as a basic constraint on choice rules because, as we have
emphasized above, we want to ultimately achieve stable (or fair) assignments of students
2This assumption is reasonable, but not important for our results. We only use it because it makes
it easier to write some of our proofs. As far as we know, none of our results depend on it.
3Note that gross substitutes is formally identical to Sen’s α. The interpretation is different, though,
because here C(S) is the chosen subset of C(S), not a set of alternatives that are “equally good.”
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to schools. By looking at other axioms we obtain four different basic models of controlled
school choice.
Aside from gross substitutes, we can classify the axioms in two categories, diversity
and rationality axioms. The following table summarizes our main results:
Model Diversity Rationality
GS Mon DD Eff RM t-WARP SARP1 SARP 2
Ideal point X X X
Schur X X X X
Soft quotas X X X X
Hard quotas X X X X
The first category of axioms constrain distributions over types, we think of them as
diversity axioms. We have looked at four such axioms: The monotonicity axiom (Mon
in the table) says that an increase in the distribution over the set of applicants should
result in an increase in the distribution over the admitted students. The distribution
dependence axiom (DD) is a weaker form of monotonicity, and requires that if two sets
of applicants have the same distribution, then the sets of admitted students should also
have the same distribution. The efficiency axiom (Eff) states that a student should
never be rejected if there is an empty seat. Rejection maximality (RM) requires that if
a student is rejected from a school that has space for him, then a maximal number of
students of his type must have been achieved.
The second category of axioms impose basic rationality criteria: they are versions of
standard axioms from revealed preference theory. We use them here to elicit a priority
order over individual students that is compatible with the choice rule. The type-weak
axiom of revealed preference (tWARP) deals with comparisons between students of the
same type. We look at two versions of the strong axiom of revealed preference (SARP1
and SARP2), which become relevant once we compare students of different types.4
Our results deal with four basic models of choice. As we discuss in Sections 7 and 8,
these are close to systems that are already used in many places to achieve diversity.
The first two models are somewhat rigid: the “ideal point” model tries first to achieve
a distribution over types that is as close as possible (in Euclidean distance) to some ideal
distribution over types. Given such a choice, it selects the best available, or highest
4One final axiom, irrelevance of rejected students, was omitted from the table. It is a basic rationality
criterion, and it is satisfied by all our models. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a normative model of choice
that would violate irrelevance of rejected students.
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priority, students of each type. In the Schur model the distribution does not try to
approximate some ideal point but instead it seeks to maximize some measure of the
degree of diversity of the school.
The first two models are rigid because, given a set of applicants, they first formulate
the distribution of the choice set, and then admit the highest priority students of every
type without exceeding the distribution. In the next two models, hard and soft quotas,
there is some tradeoff between the priority of students of different types and the distri-
bution over types. A student of one type may be admitted over a student of a different
type because he has a higher priority. Of course, the degree to which this can happen is
limited by diversity considerations.
In the model of soft quotas, a school reserves a number of seats for each type. The
school then tries to fill these reserved seats; some of them may be unfilled if there are
not enough applicants of a given type. For the remaining seats, which are not taken yet,
students compete “openly”. This model is flexible because the distribution over types is
partially determined by the students’ priorities.
In the model of hard quotas, instead of seats being reserved for a type, there is an
upper bound, or quota, on how many students of a given type may be accepted. Student
compete “openly” for seats until they hit the quota on their types. After that happens,
a student may be turned down in favor of a lower priority candidate whose quota has
not been obtained yet.
4 Ideal points and Schur concavity
We analyze the first two models discussed in Section 3. Both of these models involve two
basic rationality axioms.
We want a priority order over individual students to play a role in the school’s choices,
and for that we need to make sure that the choice satisfies basic revealed preference
axioms. The two axioms we use are versions of standard properties in the decision
theoretic literature, used in the study of abstract choice rules and social choice (see, e.g.,
Moulin (1991)).5
5Rationality could instead require a preference relation over sets of students. We are focusing on
priorities over individual students because it seems to be what most schools use in forming their prefer-
ences.
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Axiom 2. Choice rule C satisfies the type-weak axiom of revealed preference
(t-WARP) if, for any s, s′, S and S ′ such that τ(s) = τ(s′) and s, s′ ∈ S ∩ S ′,
s ∈ C(S) and s′ ∈ C(S ′) \ C(S) imply s ∈ C(S).
The type-weak axiom of revealed preference is necessary for the existence of some
underlying priority ordering over students. We need it to ensure that a school admits
the best students of each type, given the underlying priority order.
Our second rationality axiom simply says that a rejected student may be made un-
available without affecting the set of chosen students. It has been used before in the
matching context by Alkan (2002), and Alkan and Gale (2003); and by Fleiner (2003)
and Aygu¨n and So¨nmez (2012) for markets with contracts.
Axiom 3. Choice rule C satisfies irrelevance of rejected students (IRS) if C(S ′) ⊆
S ⊆ S ′ implies that C(S) = C(S ′).
To be clear, gross substitutes and the two rationality axioms capture standard prop-
erties of choice. Gross substitutes is important given that we want to apply our results
to matching markets.
Next, we impose axioms capturing a concern for diversity. Different axioms deliver
different choice rules: we focus on those that are generated by ideal points and Schur
concave monotone functions.
4.1 Ideal points
A school may have an ideal distribution that it tries to achieve. For example, it may
strive for perfect gender balance, or for a distribution over races and ethnicities that
match those in the population. Here we characterize those rules that try to minimize the
Euclidean distance from the distribution of admitted students to the ideal distribution.
In Sections 7 and 8 we give examples of how actual school districts’ policies reflect this
concern.
Choice rule C is generated by an ideal point if there is a vector z∗ ∈ Zd+ with
||z∗|| ≤ q and a strict priority  over S such that, for any S ⊆ S, (1) ξ(C(S)) is the
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closest vector to z∗, among those in B(ξ(S)) where
B(x) ≡ {z ∈ Zd+ : z ≤ x and ||z|| ≤ q};
and (2) the students of type t in C(S) have higher priority than any student of type t in
S \ C(S), for any t.
Our next axiom states that an increase in the number of applicants of every type
should give rise to an increase in the admissions of every type.
Axiom 4. Choice rule C satisfies distribution-monotonicity (Mon) if ξ(S) ≤ ξ(S ′)
implies that ξ(C(S)) ≤ ξ(C(S ′)).
One consequence of distribution-monotonicity is to say that a school prioritizes its
distribution. It “first” fixes a target distribution, and then chooses the best student body
to fit that distribution. It is, therefore, a strong assumption, and possibly questionable
(the models of soft and hard quotas in Section 5 relax this assumption). We believe
that it is a good approximation to how many schools operate in actuality because many
schools have diversity targets independently of the quality-composition of the body of
applicants.
Importantly, distribution-monotonicity is compatible with most forms of pure diver-
sity concerns. Including diversity policies that imply a failure of gross substitutes, and
non-existence of stable matchings. Note that the example in Section 1.2 satisfies the
distribution-monotonicity axiom.
Theorem 1. Choice rule C satisfies GS, t-WARP, IRS, and Mon, if and only if it is
generated by an ideal point.
The result in Theorem 1 is surprising because the requirement of gross substitutes
has nothing to do with diversity. Rather, Mon says that the school has diversity as a
primary objective, but there are many ways in which diversity can be implemented. The
tension between gross substitutes and diversity is important enough, however, that when
we put the four axioms together, only ideal point rules survive.
Remark 1. The type-weak axiom of revealed preference alone does not suffice to give
a rationalizing priority relation because it only rules out revealed preference cycles of
length two. Normally, in a revealed-preference exercise, one needs to rule out cycles of
any length. As a result one needs the strong axiom of revealed preference (or Richter’s
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notion of consistency, see Richter (1966)).6 It is interesting that the axiom of gross
substitutes “aids” the weak axiom, and allows us to rule out cycles of any length.7
4.2 Schur concave
The distance to an ideal distribution is a reasonable criterion, but it may lead to ineffi-
ciencies. A school who is deeply committed to diversity may leave some seats empty (or
under-report its capacity) when the newcomers would upset the distribution over gender,
or race/ethnicity, of the student body. That said, it may be reasonable to require schools
to be efficient in the sense of never leaving a seat empty if they can fill it. To this end,
we now substitute the monotonicity axiom that we used above for an efficiency axiom:
the school is required to fill all seats that it can fill.
Axiom 5. Choice rule C satisfies efficiency if C(S) = S when |S| ≤ q, and |C(S)| = q
when |S| > q.
We still need to ensure that the school cares primarily about diversity: that it sets a
diversity objective independently of its body of applicants. Thus, we use the following
weakening of the distribution-monotonicity axiom.
Axiom 6. Choice rule C satisfies distribution-dependence if ξ(S) = ξ(S ′) implies
that ξ(C(S)) = ξ(C(S ′)).
When a choice rule is distribution-dependent, then for any two sets with the same
distribution the set of admitted students also have the same distribution. However, in
contrast with distribution-monotonicity, it does not say anything about two sets which
have different distributions.
As a result of these axioms, choice is driven by a measure of diversity. Researchers
studying diversity often consider numerical measures of diversity (such as entropy, or
Theil’s index). For example, the ecological diversity studied by Weitzman (1992) is a
special case of entropy. These numerical measures are often Schur concave: a property
that we shall not define here. Instead, we shall use a canonical construction of a Schur
concave function (see Marshall, Olkin, and Arnold (2010)). A school satisfying our axioms
will seek to maximize the sum of values of a monotone increasing and concave function.
6Alternatively, one may have to observe choice from all sets with two or three elements, but such
a condition is not useful in the present model. Ehlers and Sprumont (2008) is one study of behavior
described by WARP, allowing for cyclic choices. In our case it turns out that cycles are ruled out by the
interaction of t-WARP with GS and IRS.
7The reason is partly that GS coincides with Sen’s α.
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More formally, we say that C is Schur-generated if there is a point z∗ ∈ Zd+ with
||z∗|| ≤ q, an increasing and concave function g : R→ R, and a strict priority  over S
such that
1.
∑d
t=1 g(xt − z∗t ) achieves a maximum in B(ξ(S)) at ξ(C(S));
2. ξ(C(S)) = ξ(C(S ′)) for any S and S ′ with ξ(S) = ξ(S ′); and
3. students of type t in C(S) have higher priority than any student of type t in S\C(S).
Theorem 2. Choice rule C satisfies GS, t-WARP, IRS, efficiency, and distribution-
dependence, if and only if it is Schur-generated.
The interpretation of this model is as follows. Suppose that z∗ = 0. Then the
maximization of
∑d
t=1 g(xt) involves values of xt which are as close to each other as
possible. That is, it seeks to obtain equal representation of all types in the school.
Otherwise, when z∗ > 0, then the maximum is going to be achieved at a point when
x ≥ z∗ and xt − z∗t are as close to each other as possible. Equivalently, the school tries
to achieve a distribution of students z∗ and tries to get the same number of students in
excess.
5 Hard and soft quotas
The model in Section 4 is restrictive in the sense that diversity considerations pin down
a unique distribution, and then a priority relation is used to choose students within each
type. This is restrictive because, given the distribution of the applicant body, only one
distribution is allowed for the admitted students. In this section we consider schools that
may have a more flexible commitment to diversity.
In particular, we may want to allow a school to trade off students of different types.
Such a trade off may directly conflict with diversity concerns: it may involve rejecting
an undesirable type 1 student in favor of a good type 2 student, thereby affecting the
distribution over types.
5.1 Hard quotas
A school may want to limit the number of admitted students who has the same type, so
it may have a type-specific limit or quota for each type. However, as long as these quotas
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are not exceeded, the school does not differentiate between students with different types.
This is the model studied in Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003).
Choice rule C is generated by hard quotas if there exist a strict priority  over
S, and a vector (rt)t∈T ∈ Zd+, such that for any S ⊆ S,
1. |C(S)t| ≤ rt;
2. if s ∈ C(S), s′ ∈ S \ C(S) and s′  s, then it must be the case that τ(s) 6= τ(s′)
and
∣∣C(S)τ(s′)∣∣ = rτ(s′); and
3. if s ∈ S \ C(S), then either |C(S)| = q or ∣∣C(S)τ(s)∣∣ = rτ(s).
In this case, rt is an upper bound on the number of students of type t that the
school can accept. The school considers all students and chooses the highest ranked ones
conditional on not exceeding any of the quotas. In particular, if ||r|| ≤ q then this model
is equivalent to the ideal point model.
Say that S is ineffective for t if there is S ′ such that |St| = |S ′t| with |C(S)t| <
|C(S ′)t|. In words, a set is ineffective for type t when the school does not accept the
maximum number of type t students among the sets with the same number of type t
applicants. This notion of ineffectiveness is crucial in our axiom below.
Axiom 7. Choice rule C satisfies the effective strong axiom of revealed prefer-
ence (E-SARP) if there are no sequences {sk}Kk=1 and {Sk}Kk=1, of students and sets
of students, respectively, such that, for all k
1. sk+1 ∈ C(Sk+1) and sk ∈ Sk+1 \ C(Sk+1);
2. τ(sk+1) = τ(sk) or Sk+1 is ineffective for τ(sk).
(using addition mod K).
E-SARP rules out certain cycles in the revealed preference of the choice rule, but
it is careful as to where it infers a revealed preference from choice. The subtlety in the
definition is the second part that requires either τ(sk+1) = τ(sk) or that Sk+1 is ineffective
for τ(sk). In the first case, when sk+1 and sk have the same type, it is revealed that sk+1
has a higher priority than sk. However, when they have different types, sk+1 is revealed
preferred to sk only when Sk+1 is ineffective for τ(sk) implying that the school could
admit more students of type τ(sk). It is easy to see that E-SARP implies t-WARP.
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Our next axiom is a diversity axiom. It states that whenever a student of type t is
rejected from a set of students S when there is an empty seat in the school, then it must
be the case that the school has admitted the most number of type t students for any
possible set of applicants.
Axiom 8. Choice rule C satisfies rejection maximality (RM) if s ∈ S \ C(S) and
|C(S)| < q imply that ∣∣C(S)τ(s)∣∣ ≥ ∣∣C(S ′)τ(s)∣∣ for every S ′.
In words, if a student of type t is rejected when there is an empty seat, then it must be
that the school has admitted the most number of type t students. Rejection maximality
is the main axiom we use to construct the hard quotas.
Theorem 3. Choice rule C satisfies GS, E-SARP, and RM if and only if C is generated
by hard quotas.
Remark 2. We characterize choice rules that are generated by hard quotas in terms of
GS, E-SARP and RM. However, it is easy to see that if a choice rule C is generated by
hard quotas then it also satisfies IRS. We reconcile this observation with the result above
by showing that if a choice rule satisfies GS and RM then it also satisfies IRS.
Suppose that choice rule C satisfies GS and RM. Let S ′ and S be such that C(S ′) ⊆
S ⊆ S ′. By GS, C(S ′) ⊆ C(S). Suppose for contradiction that there exists s ∈ C(S) \
C(S ′). This implies that s ∈ S ′ \C(S ′) and |C(S ′)| < q. By RM, ∣∣C(S ′)τ(s)∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣C(Sˆ)τ(s)∣∣∣
for any Sˆ. Letting Sˆ = S yields,
∣∣C(S ′)τ(s)∣∣ ≥ ∣∣C(S)τ(s)∣∣, which is a contradiction since
C(S ′) ⊆ C(S) and s ∈ C(S) \ C(S ′). Therefore, there does not exist s ∈ C(S) \ C(S ′),
so C(S) = C(S ′) and IRS is satisfied.
Even when ||r|| > q a choice rule that is generated by hard quotas r can be inefficient.
For example, suppose that all applicants have the same type and their quota is less than
the capacity of the school. In this case, the school is not going to fill its capacity. Next,
we impose efficiency and IRS instead of rejection maximality and get a different model
that can be characterized by soft quotas.
5.2 Soft Quotas
Suppose that there are type-specific bounds that the school would like to implement.
In other words, the school limits the number of students of each type that it admits.
However, if the school cannot fill its capacity by imposing these bounds, then it can still
admit more students until the capacity is filled or the set of applicants is exhausted.
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Therefore, these bounds are not hard quotas as we have defined above but soft quotas.
We capture this notion below.
More formally, choice rule C is generated by soft quotas if there exist a strict
priority  over S, and a vector (rt)t∈T ∈ Zd+ with ||r|| ≤ q, such that for any S ⊆ S,
1. |C(S)t| ≥ rt ∧ |St|;
2. if s ∈ C(S), s′ ∈ S \ C(S) and s′  s, then it must be the case that τ(s) 6= τ(s′)
and
∣∣C(S)τ(s)∣∣ ≤ rτ(s); and
3. if s ∈ S \ C(S), then |C(S)| = q.
In words, the school reserves rt seats for students of type t. Given a pool of students S,
it admits the best rt ∧ |St| students according to priority . In a second stage, it admits
the best (according to priority ) students regardless of type, among the remaining
students.
Say that t ∈ T is saturated at S if there is S ′ such that |St| = |S ′t| with S ′t\C(S ′)t 6=
∅. The interpretation is that when there are |St| students the school is not obliged to
accept them all out of diversity considerations. Our first axiom builds on this notion.
Axiom 9. Choice rule C satisfies the adapted strong axiom of revealed preference
(A-SARP) if there are no sequences {sk}Kk=1 and {Sk}Kk=1, of students and sets of
students, respectively, such that, for all k
1. sk+1 ∈ C(Sk+1) and sk ∈ Sk+1 \ C(Sk+1);
2. τ(sk+1) = τ(sk) or τ(sk+1) is saturated at Sk+1
(using addition mod K).
The adapted SARP rules out the existence of certain cycles in revealed preference,
where again we are careful as to when we infer the existence of a revealed preference. It
is stronger than t-WARP. The difference between E-SARP and A-SARP is the second
component of the definition, when we require that τ(sk+1) is saturated at Sk+1. When
this happens, even though the school could admit fewer type τ(sk+1) students, it accepts
more. Thus in the revealed preference, sk+1 is preferred to sk even if they have different
types. This axiom allows us to construct a priority order over students.
Theorem 4. Choice rule C satisfies GS, A-SARP, Eff and IRS if and only if C is
generated by soft quotas.
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6 Implications for school choice and matching mar-
kets
A matching market is a tuple 〈C,S, (s)s∈S , (Cc)c∈C〉, in which C is a finite set of
schools , S is a finite set of students , for each s ∈ S; s is a strict preference order
over C ∪ {s} where {s} is the outside option for student s,8 and for each c ∈ C; Cc is a
choice rule over S.
A matching (or an assignment) µ is a function on the set of agents such that
1. µ(c) ⊆ S for all c ∈ C and µ(s) ∈ C ∪ {s} for all s ∈ S;
2. s ∈ µ(c) if and only if µ(s) = c for all c ∈ C and s ∈ S.
In a matching market, we would like to find stable matchings that satisfy indiviual
rationality and fairness properties that we formalize below.
Definition 1. A matching µ is stable if
1. (individual rationality) Cc(µ(c)) = µ(c) for all c ∈ C, µ(s) s {s} for all s ∈ S;
and
2. (no blocking) there exists no (c, S ′) such that S ′ 6⊆ µ(c) such that S ′ ⊆ Cc(µ(c) ∪
S ′) and c s µ(s) for all s ∈ S ′.
Stability requires both individual rationality and no blocking. First, individual ra-
tionality for schools requires that no school can be better off by rejecting some of the
admitted students; whereas for students it only requires that each student prefers their
assigned schools to their outside options. Second, no blocking requires that there exists
no coalition of agents who can beneficially rematch among themselves. This is the stan-
dard definition of stability used in many-to-one matching problems (Roth and Sotomayor,
1990).
For matching markets, stability has proved to be a useful solution concept because
mechanisms that find stable matchings are successful in practice (Roth, 2008). Moreover,
finding stable matchings is relatively easy. In particular, the deferred acceptance algo-
rithm of Gale and Shapley (1962) finds a stable matching and the algorithm has other
attractable properties. Therefore, it also serves as a recipe for market design. For exam-
ple, it has been adapted in New York and Boston school districts (see Abdulkadirog˘lu,
8The outside option for student s can be going to a private school or being homeschooled.
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Pathak, Roth, and So¨nmez (2005) and Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, and Roth (2005)). For
completeness, we provide a description of the student-proposing deferred acceptance al-
gorithm.
Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DA)
Step 1 Each student applies to her most preferred school. Suppose that S1c is the set of
students who applied to school c. School c tentatively admits students in Cc(S
1
c )
and permanently rejects the rest. If there are no rejections, stop.
Step k Each student who was rejected at Step k−1 applies to their next preferred school.
Suppose that Skc is the set of new applicants and students tentatively admitted at
the end of Step k − 1 for school c. School c tentatively admits students in Cc(Skc )
and permanently rejects the rest. If there are no rejections, stop.
The algorithm ends in finite time since at least one student is rejected at each step.9
Usually the only strategic component of a matching market is the student preference
profile (s)s∈S ; schools’ choice rules are fixed by laws and regulations. Therefore, we only
worry that students and their families state their preferences truthfully. To this end, we
consider a group strategyproofness concept.
Let PS be the space of student preference profiles (s)s∈S andM be space of match-
ings between C and S. Therefore, a mechanism is a function Φ : PS →M.
Definition 2. Mechanism Φ is group incentive compatible for students if there
exists no group of students S ′, preference profiles (s)s∈S , and (′s)s∈S′ such that
Φ((′s)s∈S′ , (s)s∈S\S′) s Φ((s)s∈S)
for all s ∈ S ′.
In words, a mechanism is group incentive compatible for students if there exists no
group of students who can jointly manipulate their preferences to be matched with better
schools.
The following axiom for choice rules plays a critical role in establishing the desirable
properties of the deferred acceptance algorithm.
9For a history of the deferred acceptance algorithm, see Roth (2008).
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Axiom 10. Choice rule C satisfies the law of aggregate demand (LAD) if S ⊆ S ′
implies |C(S)| ≤ |C(S ′)|.
The law of aggregate demand requires that the number of students chosen from a
subset of a set of students S ′ should not be bigger than the number of students chosen
from S ′. This property was first introduced in Alkan (2002) and Alkan and Gale (2003) for
matching markets without transfers (or contracts), and by Fleiner (2003) and Hatfield
and Milgrom (2005) for markets with contracts. All of the choice rules that we have
studied in Sections 4 and 5 satisfy LAD. In particular, it is easy to see that distribution
monotonicity or efficiency implies LAD.
The following result is well-known (see Roth and Sotomayor (1990), Hatfield and
Milgrom (2005), Hatfield and Kojima (2009), and Aygu¨n and So¨nmez (2012)). We state
it here to highlight the role of the properties that we have studied in Sections 4 and 5.
Theorem 5. Suppose that schools’ choice rules satisfy IRS and GS, then DA produces the
stable matching that is simultaneously the best stable matching for all students. Suppose,
furthermore, that choice rules satisfy LAD, then DA is group incentive compatible for
students and each school is matched with the same number of students in any stable
matching.
We refer the outcome of DA, as the student optimal stable matching. Below we
compare the outcomes of DA when schools have different choice rules.
Theorem 6. Consider two substitutable choice rule profiles (Cc)c∈C and (C ′c)c∈C. Suppose
that Cc(S) ⊆ C ′c(S) for every S ⊆ S and c ∈ C. Let µ and µ′ be DA outcomes with (Cc)c∈C
and (C ′c)c∈C, respectively. Then µ
′(s) s µ(s) for all s.
Therefore, if choice rule C ′ selects more students than choice rule C, then all students
weakly prefer DA with C ′ to DA with C. In fact, a slightly more general statement is
true: Suppose that (C ′)c∈C is a substitutable choice rule profile and µ′ is the outcome
of DA with this choice rule profile. Then if (C)c∈C is a choice rule profile such that
Cc(S) ⊆ C ′c(S) for every S ⊆ S, c ∈ C and µ is a stable matching with (C)c∈C, then
µ′(s) s µ(s) for all s. In other words, we do not need that (C)c∈C is a substitutable
choice rule profile. We make this assumption to make the statement easier. Otherwise,
we need to assume that there exists a stable matching with respect to (C)c∈C.
In particular, we can compare the outcome of DA with choice rules that are generated
by soft quotas and hard quotas:
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Corollary 1. Suppose that Cc is generated by hard quotas (r
c
t )t∈T and C
′
c is generated by
soft quotas (rct )t∈T where ||rc|| ≤ qc for every school c. Let µ and µ′ be the DA outcomes
with (Cc)c∈C and (C ′c)c∈C, respectively. Then µ
′(s) s µ(s) for all s.
This follows directly from Theorem 6 above. Indeed, if student s is rejected by C ′c
from S, i.e., if s ∈ S \ C ′c(S), then ξ(C ′c(S))τ(s) ≥ rτ(s) and for any s′ ∈ C ′c(S) with
τ(s′) = τ(s) we have s′ c s. Therefore, s cannot be chosen by choice rule C from S
since there are at least rτ(s) students of type τ(s) who have higher ranking than s in S.
Corollary also implies that all students weakly prefer DA using Schur-generated choice
rules to DA using ideal point generated choice rules with the same reference points. In
fact, we can say more than that for particular reference points:
Theorem 7. Suppose that Cc satisfies GS and distribution-dependence and that d = 2.
Let z∗c = ξ(Cc(S)) for each c. Let µ be the DA outcome using choice profile (Cc)c∈C, µi
the DA outcome using choice profile with rules that are generated by ideal points z∗c for
each c, and µs be the DA outcome using choice rules that are Schur-generated z∗c for each
c. Then
µs(s) s µ(s) s µi(s),
for all s.
Therefore, with this particular choice of z∗, we get that students prefer the outcome
of DA using the Schur-generated choice rules, to DA using the original choice profile to
DA using the ideal point generated choice rules.
Finally, in the next result, we consider matching markets in which schools’ choice
rules are generated by hard quotas. For this market, we establish a type specific “rural
hospital theorem”:
Theorem 8. Suppose that for each school c, choice rule Cc is generated by hard quotas
rc. If there exists a stable matching µ such that |µt(c)| < rtc and |µ(c)| < qc then for any
stable matching µ′, µ′t(c) = µt(c).
This result follows immediately from Kojima (2012). He shows that the same con-
clusion holds when schools preferences satisfy a more general condition called separable
with affirmative action constraints.
In particular, if schools’ choice rules are generated by ideal points then each school’s
student distribution is the same in all stable matchings, i.e., the diversity of schools are
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the same in all stable matchings. Therefore, as long as the the school district implements
an algorithm that finds a stable matching, each school incoming student composition in
terms of types are exactly the same.
7 Controlled school choice in the US
The legal background on diversity in school admissions is complicated. Since the land-
mark 1954 Brown vs. Board of Education supreme court ruling, which ended school
segregation, many school districts have attempted to achieve more integrated schools.
The current legal environment is summarized in the 2011 guidelines issued by the US
departments of justice and education: “Guidance on the voluntary use of race to achieve
diversity and avoid racial isolation in elementary and secondary schools.” (There is a sep-
arate set of guidelines for college admissions.) We shall not summarize these guidelines
here, but suffice it say here that they are perfectly compatible with the theory developed
in this paper.
In particular, the “race neutral” approaches described in the guidelines can be carried
out through our methods (race neutrality goes into the definition of types). We proceed
to briefly describe some of the best know programs in the US.
7.1 Jefferson County
The Jefferson County (KY) School District is prominent in promoting diversity among
its schools, and the litigation surrounding its admissions policies serve partly as basis for
the guidelines mentioned above. Starting from the early 1970s, the student assignment
plan used in the Jefferson County went through major changes. First, in order to avoid
segregation, a racial assignment plan was used and students were bused to their schools.
In early 1990s a school choice system was implemented, allowing parents to state their
preferences. In 1996, schools were required to have between 15 and 50 percent of African-
American students. In 2002 a lawsuit was filed against the Jefferson County School
District because it had a racial admissions policy. After a litigation process, the case
came before the US Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in 2007 ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs, and decided that race cannot be the only factor to use for admissions.
Following this ruling, the Jefferson County switched to an assignment plan that con-
sidered the socioeconomic status of parents: Using census data, the school district divided
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the county into two regions and required all schools to have 15 and 50 percent of their
students to be from the first region.
The Jefferson County is undergoing yet another change at the moment. The new
assignment plan, which was accepted by the school district to be implemented in 2013/14
admissions cycle, divides students into three types: Type 1, Type 2 and Type 3. These
types are determined by educational attainment, household income, and percentage of
white residents in the census block group that the student lives in. Then each school is
assigned a diversity index, defined as the average of student types. The new admissions
policy requires each school to have a diversity index between 1.4 and 2.5.
These two assignment policies are in conflict with the gross substitutes (GS) axiom,
so it would be incompatible with a school choice plan that would seek to install a stable
matching. It should be clear, however, that the rules proposed in our paper can achieve
similar objectives to the ones in the current policies, while satisfying gross substitutes.
7.2 Chicago
Chicago Public Schools also strive for diversity (Pathak and So¨nmez, 2012; Kominers
and So¨nmez, 2012). To this end, they have an affirmative action policy that uses so-
cioeconomic status to divide students into four types: Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3 and Tier 4.
Students who would like to attend selective high schools take a centralized exam that is
used to determine a score of each student. Each school allocates 40 percent of their seats
to the students with the highest rank and then 15 percent of the seats are allocated to
each tier separately. In particular, if a school is divided into two fictitious schools one
representing open seats and the other representing the rest, this affirmative action policy
can be viewed as the hard quotas / ideal point model as follows: For the first fictitious
school, the quota for each type can be the capacity of the school whereas for the second
fictitious school the quota for each type can be 15 percent of the total school capacity.
In particular, the actual implementation of the affirmative action policy is very similar
to this. By Corollary 6, if the Chicago school district switched to a soft quota policy
that uses of choice rules generated by soft quotas for the second fictitious school with the
same quotas, all students would weakly benefit.10
Alternatively, the Chicago system could be modified to satisfy the model of soft
10Kominers and So¨nmez (2012) has a different counterfactual in which students either rank the
fictitious school representing the open slots first or last.
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quotas. This would involve first filling the spaces that are reserved to each type, and then
having types compete openly for the remaining spaces. Depending on the distribution of
scores for each type, the quotas could be calibrated to achieve the effect desired by the
school district. The result has the advantage of fitting directly into the existing stable
matching school choice mechanism.
8 Controlled School Choice in Other Countries
Affirmative action can be found in many countries around the world (Sowell, 2004). We
focus here on affirmative action in school admissions. Some of the affirmative action
policies implement preferential policies whereas some of them implement policies based
on quotas. The preferential policies resemble the soft quota model that we study above,
while policies based on quotas are similar to hard quotas model with regional variations in
actual implementation. There are many countries that have similar policies including but
not limited to Brazil, China, Germany, Finland, Macedonia, Malaysia, Norway, Romania,
Sri Lanka, and the United States. Below we discuss two particular examples: college
admissions in India and high school admissions in French-speaking Belgium.
8.1 Indian College Admissions
In India the caste system divides society into hereditary groups, castes (“types” in our
model). Historically, it enforces a particular division of labor and power in society, and
places severe limits on socioeconomic mobility. To overcome this, the Indian constitution
has since 1950 implemented affirmative action. It enforces that the “scheduled castes”
(SCs) and “scheduled tribes” (STs) are represented in government jobs and public uni-
versities proportional to their population percentage in the state that they belong to.
These percentages change from state to state. For example, in Andhra Pradesh, each
college reserves 15 percent of its seats for SCs, 6 percent for STs, 35 percent for other
‘backward classes’ and the remaining 44 percent is left open for all students.
The college admissions to these public schools is administered by the state, and it
works as follows. Students take a centralized exam that determines their ranking. Then
students are called one by one to make their choices from the available colleges. In each
college, first the open seats are filled. Afterwards the reserved seats are filled only by
students for whom the seats were reserved. This model corresponds to the situation
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described above for Chicago. Therefore, this affirmative action policy fits into our hard
quotas / ideal point model in which we replace each school with two copies, the first
representing the open seats and the second representing the rest. For the first copy of
the college, each student is treated the same and the choice rule picks the best available
students regardless of their caste. Similar to the Chicago school district, if a soft quota
policy was used, all students would be weakly better off.
The choice rule can also be generated by soft quotas in which each quota is greater
than the school’s capacity. But the second copy of the college implements a choice
rule that is generated by the hard quota / ideal point model described in the previous
paragraph.11
8.2 High Schools in French-Speaking Belgium
In French-speaking Belgium, high school admissions is done to promote diversity. How-
ever, in contrast with many examples we have seen thus far, the target of affirmative
action policy is the set of students who have attended “disadvantaged primary schools.”
The administration announces these primary schools, which may change each year de-
pending on supply and demand. Each school is required to reserve at least 15 percent
of their seats to students from disadvantaged primary schools, and also some seats for
students living in the neighborhood of the school. If a reserved seat for either group
cannot be filled then it can also be allocated to other students as long as there is no
student from the privileged group willing to take that seat. This choice corresponds to
the soft quotas model described above.
9 Auxiliary lemmas
The general approach we follow here is the following: We translate considerations related
to distributions into results on functions on Zd+. Therefore, most of our results follow
from mapping C into a function or a correspondence defined on Zd+. In particular, it
turns out that some of our axioms have interesting counterparts as properties of such
functions and correspondences.
11For an empirical study of affirmative action policies in Andhra Pradesh see Bagde, Epple, and
Taylor (2011).
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9.1 Notational Convention
We first lay out some notational conventions. For A ⊆ Zd+, ∂A ≡ {z ∈ A : z′  z ⇒
z′ /∈ A}, where z′  z if and only if z′t > zt for all t and, similarly, let ∂MA ≡ {z ∈ A :
z′ > z ⇒ z′ /∈ A}.
Let et denote the unit vector in Z
d
+ with 0 in all its entries except that corresponding
to t, in which it has 1.
9.2 Ideal point model
We shall first introduce some simple lemmas related to functions on Zd+. Hopefully the
discussion is suggestive of how we use these lemmas in proving our main results.
Let f : Zd+ → Zd+. We say that f is monotone increasing if y ≤ x implies that
f(y) ≤ f(x); f is within budget if f(x) ∈ B(x) = {y : 0 ≤ y ≤ x, ||y|| ≤ q}; that f
satisfies gross substitutes if
y ≤ x⇒ f(x) ∧ y ≤ f(y).
A function f is generated by an ideal point if there is z∗ ∈ Zd+ such that ||z∗|| ≤ q,
and f(x) minimizes the Euclidean distance to z∗ among the vectors in B(x).
Lemma 1. Function f is monotone increasing, within budget and satisfies gross substi-
tutes if and only if it is generated by an ideal point.
We need the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Let z∗ ∈ Zd+ satisfy ||z∗|| ≤ q. Then x ∧ z∗ is the unique minimizer of the
Euclidean distance to z∗ among the vectors in B(x).
Proof of Lemma 2. First note that x∧z∗ ∈ B(x). The distance from z to z∗ is minimized
if
∑
t(zt − z∗t )2 is minimized. The lemma follows from the observation that one can
minimize, for each t, (zt − z∗t )2 by setting zt = min{xt, z∗t }: when min{xt, z∗t } = z∗t this
is trivial, and when min{xt, z∗t } = xt then there are no z ∈ B(x) with zt > xt. Since
zt = min{xt, z∗t } for every t, we get z = x ∧ z∗.
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Proof of Lemma 1. We first show that if f is generated by an ideal point z∗ with ||z∗|| ≤
q, then it is monotone increasing, within budget and it satisfies gross substitutes. Suppose
that the ideal point is z∗. By Lemma 2, f(x) = x ∧ z∗. Then f(x) ≤ x and ||f(x)|| ≤
||z∗|| ≤ q, so f is within budget. Next we show monotonicity:
y ≤ x⇒ y ∧ z∗ ≤ x ∧ z∗ ⇒ f(y) ≤ f(x).
Last we show gross substitutes. Let y ≤ x. Then,
f(x) ∧ y = (x ∧ z∗) ∧ y = (x ∧ y) ∧ z∗ = y ∧ z∗ = f(y).
It will be useful to consider an additional property. We say that f satisfies the
boundary condition if f(x) ∈ ∂B(x).
We now turn to proving that the axioms are sufficient for generation by an ideal point.
We suppose that f : Zd+ → Zd+ is a function satisfying monotonicity, gross substitutes,
and it is within budget. We show that it must be generated by some ideal point. We
consider two different cases, the case when f satisfies the boundary condition and when
it does not.
First, suppose that f satisfies the boundary condition. Let xˆ such that xˆt ≥ q for all
t and z∗ ≡ f(xˆ). Note that ∑t z∗t = q because
f(xˆ) ∈ ∂B(xˆ) = {z ∈ Zd+ :
∑
t
zt = q},
by the choice of xˆ. We show that, for all y, f(y) minimizes the distance to z∗ in B(y).
Note if y ≤ x then the monotonicity of f , and that f(y) ≤ y implies that f(y) ≤
y ∧ f(x). Thus the gross substitute axiom becomes:
y ≤ x⇒ f(x) ∧ y = f(y). (1)
Now, xˆ ≤ xˆ∨y, so z∗ = f(xˆ) ≤ f(xˆ∨y), as f is monotone increasing. Then∑t z∗t = q
and f(xˆ∨ y) ∈ ∂B(xˆ∨ y) implies that z∗ = f(xˆ∨ y). Now, y ≤ xˆ∨ y and the substitutes
condition gives us that
f(y) = y ∧ f(xˆ ∨ y) = y ∧ z∗.
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By Lemma 2, f(y) minimizes the distance to z∗ in B(y).
We finish the proof by considering the case when f does not satisfy the boundary
condition. In this case there is z∗ such that f(z∗) 6∈ ∂B(z∗). We shall prove that f is
generated by ideal point f(z∗).
Let x ∈ Zd+. Note that z∗ ∧ x ≤ z∗, monotonicity, and gross substitutes, imply (using
equation (1)) that
f(z∗ ∧ x) = (z∗ ∧ x) ∧ f(z∗) = (z∗ ∧ f(z∗)) ∧ x = f(z∗) ∧ x.
Similarly, z∗ ∧ x ≤ x gives us that
f(z∗ ∧ x) = (z∗ ∧ x) ∧ f(x) = (x ∧ f(x)) ∧ z∗ = f(x) ∧ z∗.
Thus, f(z∗) ∧ x = f(x) ∧ z∗. Now observe that f(z∗) 6∈ ∂B(z∗) means that f(z∗) z∗;
so f(z∗) ∧ x  z∗. Then f(z∗) ∧ x = f(x) ∧ z∗ is only possible if f(z∗) ∧ x = f(x). By
Lemma 2 f(x) minimizes the distance to f(z∗) in B(x).
Remark 3. When the ideal point z∗ is such that
∑
t z
∗
t = q, then the ideal point rule also
satisfies the boundary condition. To see this, suppose first that z∗ ≤ x. Then ∑t z∗t = q
implies that f(x) = x ∧ z∗ = z∗ ∈ ∂B(x). If, on the other hand, z∗  x then there is
t such that xt = (x ∧ z∗)t = f(x)t; so if z  f(x) then z /∈ B(x), as zt > f(x)t = xt.
Therefore, f(x) ∈ ∂B(x).
9.3 Schur concavity
We say that f : Zd+ → Zd+ is Schur-generated if there is z∗ ∈ Zd+ such that ||z∗|| ≤ q and
a monotone increasing and concave function g : R → R, such that f(x) is a maximizer
of
∑d
t=1 g(xt− z∗t ) in the set B(x) for all x. Similarly, f is efficient if f(x) ∈ ∂M(B(x))
for all x.
Lemma 3. A function f is efficient and satisfies gross substitutes if and only if it is
Schur-generated.
Proof. Let f satisfy the two axioms. Let xˆ be such that xˆt > q for all t, and let z
∗ ≡ f(xˆ).
For any α ∈ R, let
g(α) ≡ α ∧ q + (α− α ∧ q)/2.
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Notice that g is strictly monotone increasing and concave. Let ν(x) ≡∑t g(xt + q− z∗t ).
Since g is monotone increasing and concave, so is ν.
We shall prove that f(y) maximizes ν in B(y). To prove this, we show that f(y) ≥
z∗∧y. Note that this suffices because it says that f(y)t ≥ z∗t when yt > z∗t , and f(y)t = yt
(as f(y) ≤ y) when yt ≤ z∗t ; by definition of ν and the axiom of efficiency, ν is maximized
by such an f .
Now, that f(y) ≥ z∗∧y follows from gross substitutes in the case that y ≤ xˆ. Suppose
then that y  xˆ.
First, y ∧ xˆ ≤ xˆ and gross substitutes imply that f(y ∧ xˆ) ≥ z∗ ∧ (y ∧ xˆ) = z∗ ∧ y, as
z∗ = z∗ ∧ xˆ.
Second, y ∧ xˆ ≤ y and gross substitutes imply that
f(y ∧ xˆ) ≥ f(y) ∧ (y ∧ xˆ) = (f(y) ∧ y) ∧ xˆ = f(y) ∧ xˆ = f(y).
Then y  xˆ implies that ||y|| > q, so efficiency of f implies that ||f(y)|| = q. Then
f(y ∧ xˆ) ≥ f(y) and ||f(y ∧ xˆ)|| ≤ q give us that f(y ∧ xˆ) = f(y). We showed above that
f(y ∧ xˆ) ≥ z∗ ∧ y, so we obtain that f(y) ≥ z∗ ∧ y as desired.
10 Proofs from Section 4
10.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Suppose that C satisfies the axioms. We shall prove that it is generated by an ideal
point. To this end, we show that there exist an ideal point z∗ and a strict priority  such
that the choice function created by these coincides with C. The result follows essentially
from Lemma 1 above.
Define f as follows. For any x, let S be such that x = ξ(S) and let f(x) = ξ(C(S)).
By distribution-monotonicity we know that ξ(S) = ξ(S ′) ⇒ ξ(C(S)) = ξ(C(S ′)), so the
particular choice of S does not matter; f is well defined. Moreover, when y ≤ x we
have f(y) ≤ f(x), again by distribution-monotonicity. So f is a monotone increasing
function. In addition, f(x) ≤ x, so f is within budget. Let z∗ be as defined in the proof
of Lemma 1. Since f(z∗) = z∗, we have that |z∗| ≤ q.
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Define a binary relation R by saying that s R s′ if τ(s) = τ(s′) and there is some
S 3 s, s′ such that s ∈ C(S) and s′ /∈ C(S). We shall prove that R is transitive.
Lemma 4. If C satisfies GS, t-WARP and IRS, then R is transitive.
Proof. Let s R s′ and s′ R s′′; we shall prove that s R s′′. Let S ′ be such that s′, s′′ ∈ S ′,
s′ ∈ C(S ′), and s′′ /∈ C(S ′). Consider the set S ′ ∪ {s}. First, note that s ∈ C(S ′ ∪ {s}).
The reason is that if s /∈ C(S ′ ∪ {s}) then C(S ′ ∪ {s}) = C(S ′) 3 s′, by irrelevance of
rejected student. Thus s′ R s, in violation of the type weak axiom. Second, note that
s′′ /∈ C(S ′ ∪ {s}), as s′′ /∈ C(S ′) and C satisfies gross substitutes.
The relation R is transitive. Thus it has an extension to a linear order  over S. For
any S, and any s, s′ ∈ S with τ(s) = τ(s′) we have that s  s′ when s ∈ C(S) while
s′ /∈ C(S).
Lemma 5. If C satisfies GS then ξ(S) ≥ x ≥ y implies f(x) ∧ y ≤ f(y).
Proof. Suppose that C satisfies GS. Let ξ(S) ≥ x ≥ y and S ′ ⊆ S be such that ξ(S ′) = x.
Construct S with ξ(S) = y as follows. If yt ≥ ξ(C(S ′))t, then St ⊇ C(S ′)t. However,
if yt < ξ(C(S
′))t, then St ⊆ C(S ′)t. In the former case, C(S)t ⊇ C(S ′)t by gross
substitutes. In the later case, C(S)t = St by gross substitutes. In both cases, ξ(C(S))t ≥
min{ξ(S)t, ξ(C(S ′))t}, which implies f(y) ≥ f(x) ∧ y.
By Lemma 5, C satisfies gross substitutes implies that f satisfies gross substitutes.
In addition, f is also monotone increasing and within budget, therefore, f is generated
by an ideal point rule with z∗ by Lemma 1. Then C is generated by the ideal point z∗
and priority order .
Conversely, let C be generated by an ideal point z∗ and . It is immediate that C
satisfies t-WARP. Define f as above. Here, f is well defined because for any S and S ′
such that ξ(S) = ξ(S ′) = x, ξ(C(S)) is the closest vector to z∗ among those in B(x) and
ξ(C(S ′)) is the closest vector to z∗ among those in B(x). Therefore, ξ(C(S)) = ξ(C(S ′))
and so f is well defined.
To show that C satisfies distribution-monotonicity, let y = ξ(S) and x = ξ(S ′) such
that y ≤ x. By Lemma 2, f(x) = x∧z∗ and f(y) = y∧z∗. Then, f(x) = x∧z∗ ≤ y∧z∗ =
f(y), and, therefore, ξ(C(S)) ≤ ξ(C(S ′)). Hence, C satisfies distribution-monotonicity.
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To show that C satisfies irrelevance of rejected students, let C(S ′) ⊆ S ⊆ S ′, ξ(S ′) = x
and ξ(S) = y. By construction, ξ(C(S ′)) = x ∧ z∗ and ξ(C(S)) = y ∧ z∗. Therefore,
ξ(C(S ′)) ≥ ξ(C(S)).
On the other hand, by assumption ξ(C(S ′)) ≤ ξ(S) = y and also ξ(C(S ′)) = x∧ z∗ ≤ z∗.
The last two inequalities imply that
ξ(C(S ′)) ≤ y ∧ z∗ = ξ(C(S)).
Hence, ξ(C(S ′)) = ξ(C(S)), that is the same number of type t students are chosen from
S and S ′ for each t. Since students are chosen according to  and C(S ′) ⊆ S ⊆ S ′ we
conclude that C(S ′) = C(S).
To see that C satisfies gross substitutes, let s ∈ S ⊆ S ′, τ(s) = t, ξ(S) = y and
ξ(S ′) = x. As we have shown above, f(x) = x∧z∗ and f(y) = y∧z∗. If f(y)t ≥ f(x)t, then
more type t students are chosen in S compared to S ′. Since s ∈ C(S ′) and by construction
of the choice rule we derive that s ∈ C(S). On the other hand, if f(y)t < f(x)t, then
f(y)t < z
∗
t since f(x)t = (x∧z∗)t ≤ z∗t . Since f(y)t = (y∧z∗)t, we derive that f(y)t = yt.
That means all type t students are chosen from S, so s ∈ C(S). Hence, C satisfies gross
substitutes.
10.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Let C satisfy the axioms. By the distribution-dependence axiom we can define f as in
the proof of Theorem 1. We can also define a strict preference  to act as priority order,
by the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 1.
Now, by Lemma 5, f satisfies the assumption of gross substitutes for functions. The
axiom of efficiency for C implies that f satisfies efficiency for functions. By Lemma 3, f
is Schur-generated. This implies that C is Schur-generated.
Conversely, suppose that C is Schur-generated. It is easy to see that C satisfies t-
WARP and distribution dependence. We show that C also satisfies GS, IRS and efficiency.
For any x ≤ ξ(S), let S be such that ξ(S) = x and define f(x) ≡ ξ(C(S)). Since C is
Schur-generated, f is well defined and Schur-generated. By Lemma 3, f is efficient and
satisfies gross substitutes. That f is efficient implies C is efficient.
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To see that C satisfies gross substitutes, let s ∈ S ⊆ S ′, τ(s) = t, ξ(S) = y and
ξ(S ′) = x. Since f satisfies GS, we have
min{f(x)t, yt} ≤ f(y)t.
If yt ≤ f(x)t, then GS implies yt ≤ f(y)t, which is equivalent to yt = f(y)t. Hence,
s ∈ C(S). On the other hand, if yt ≥ f(x)t, then f(x)t ≤ f(y)t, so more type t students
are chosen from S compared to S ′. Since s ∈ C(S ′) and C satisfies t-WARP, this implies
s ∈ C(S).
To show that C satisfies irrelevance of rejected students, let C(S ′) ⊆ S ⊆ S ′, ξ(S ′) = x
and ξ(S) = y. Since C satisfies GS, C(S ′) ⊆ C(S). Suppose that there exists s ∈ C(S) \
C(S ′). Then ξ(C(S)) > ξ(C(S ′)) but this is a contradiction since ξ(C(S)) maximizes∑d
t=1 g(xt − z∗t ) in B(ξ(S)) and ξ(C(S ′)) maximizes
∑d
t=1 g(xt − z∗t ) in B(ξ(S ′)) with
B(ξ(S ′)) ⊇ B(ξ(S)).
11 Proofs from Section 5
11.1 Proof of Theorem 3
Suppose that C satisfies the axioms. We start by showing that C is generated by hard
quotas.
Let rt ≡ |C(St)| and S ⊆ S. First we prove that |C(S)t| ≤ rt. If rt = q, then
|C(S)t| ≤ rt holds trivially. Suppose that rt < q. Since |St| > q, there exists s ∈
St \ C(St). By rejection maximality, for every S, rt = |C(St)| ≥ |C(S)t|. Therefore,
|C(S)t| ≤ rt.
Let ∗ be defined as follows: s ∗ s′ if there exists S ⊇ {s, s′} such that s ∈ C(S),
s′ /∈ C(S) and either τ(s) = τ(s′) or S is ineffective at τ(s′). By the strong axiom of
revealed preference, ∗ has a linear extension  to S.
We now show that if s ∈ C(S), s′ ∈ S \C(S) and s′  s, then it must be the case that
τ(s) 6= τ(s′) and ∣∣C(S)τ(s′)∣∣ = rτ(s′). If τ(s) = τ(s′), then s ∗ s′ and s  s′, which is a
contradiction with the fact that  is an extension of ∗. So τ(s) 6= τ(s′). To prove that∣∣C(S)τ(s′)∣∣ = rτ(s′) suppose, towards a contradiction, that ∣∣C(S)τ(s′)∣∣ 6= rτ(s′). We shall
prove that S is ineffective for τ(s′), which will yield the desired contradiction, as  is
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an extension of ∗. Note that ∣∣C(S)τ(s′)∣∣ < rτ(s′) by definition of r. Let S ′ ≡ Sτ(s′). We
consider three cases. First, |C(S ′)| = q then |C(S)| < |C(S ′)| (as there is s ∈ C(S) with
τ(s) 6= τ(s′)), so S is ineffective for τ(s′). Second, consider the case when |C(S ′)| < q
and |C(S ′)| < |S ′|. Then, by rejection maximality,
|C(S ′)| = rτ(s′) >
∣∣∣C(S)τ(s′)∣∣∣ .
Hence S is ineffective for τ(s′). Third, consider the case when |C(S ′)| < q, and |C(S ′)| =
|S ′|. Then |C(S ′)| > ∣∣C(S)τ(s′)∣∣, as s′ ∈ Sτ(s′) \ C(S)τ(s′). Thus S is ineffective for τ(s′),
which implies s ∗ s′. Since  is a linear extension of ∗, we get s  s′, a contradiction.
Finally, we need to show that if s ∈ S \ C(S), then either |C(S)| = q or ∣∣C(S)τ(s)∣∣ =
rτ(s). By rejection maximality, s ∈ S \ C(S) and |C(S)| < q implies that
∣∣C(S)τ(s′)∣∣ ≥∣∣C(S ′)τ(s′)∣∣ for any S ′. We already proved that rt is the supremum of {∣∣∣C(Sˆ)t∣∣∣ : Sˆ ⊆ S}.
So we get that
∣∣C(S)τ(s′)∣∣ = rτ(s′). Hence, s ∈ S \ C(S) implies either |C(S)| = q or∣∣C(S)τ(s′)∣∣ = rτ(s′).
To finish the proof, suppose that C is generated by hard quotas. Then it is easy to
see that C satisfies the strong axiom of revealed preference and rejection maximality. We
show that it also satisfies gross substitutes. Suppose that s ∈ S ⊆ S ′ and s ∈ C(S ′). For
each type t, let S(t; rt) ⊆ St be the rt highest ranked type t students in S (if |St| ≤ rt then
S(t; rt) = S
t). Define S ′(t; rt) analogously. Since s ∈ C(S ′), we have s ∈ S ′(τ(s), rτ(s))
and the ranking of s in ∪tS ′(t; rt) is no more than q. Since S ⊆ S ′, the preceding
statements also hold for S instead of S ′, which implies that s ∈ C(S).
11.2 Proof of Theorem 4
The proof requires the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Let C satisfy GS. If y ∈ Zd+ is such that fˆ(y)t < yt then fˆ(y+et′)t < yt+1t=t′
Proof. Let y and t be as in the statement of the lemma. Let S be such that ξ(S) = y
and ξ(C(S))t < ξ(S)t = yt. Such a set S exists because fˆ(y)t < yt. Let s
′ /∈ S be an
arbitrary student with τ(s′) = t′. Note that
∅ 6= St \ C(S)t ⊆ (S ∪ {s′})t \ C(S ∪ {s′})t,
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as C satisfies GS. Then we cannot have ξ(C(S ∪ {s′}))t = yt + 1t=t′ because that would
imply (S ∪ {s′})t \ C(S ∪ {s′})t = ∅. Then
yt + 1t=t′ > ξ(C(S ∪ {s′}))t ≥ fˆ(y + et′)t.
Using Lemma 6, we can construct the vector r of minimum quotas as follows. Let
x¯ = ξ(S). The lemma implies that if fˆ(yt, x¯−t)t < yt then fˆ(y′t, x¯−t)t < y′t for all y′t > yt.
Then there is rt ∈ N such that yt > rt if and only if fˆ(yt, x¯−t) < yt. This uses the
assumption we made on the cardinality of St, which ensures that fˆ(y)t < yt if yt is large
enough. Note that we may have rt = 0.
First we prove that S ⊆ S with |St| ≤ rt then St = C(S)t. Observe that, for any x
and t, fˆ(rt, x−t) = rt. To see this note that if there is x and t such that fˆ(rt, x−t) < rt
then Lemma 6 would imply that fˆ(rt, x¯−t) < rt, in contradiction with the definition of
r. In fact, we can say more: For any x, t, and yt, if yt ≤ rt then fˆ(rt, x−t) = rt and
Lemma 6 imply that fˆ(yt, x−t) = yt. Therefore, letting S ⊆ S with |St| ≤ rt we have
that ∣∣C(S)t∣∣ ≥ fˆ(y)t = yt,
where y = ξ(S). Since yt = |St| ≥ |C(S)t| we have that St = C(S)t.
Second we prove that, if |St| > rt, then |C(S)t| ≥ rt. Let S˜ = C(S). Assume, towards
a contradiction, that
∣∣∣S˜t∣∣∣ < rt. Let S ′ = S˜∪S ′′, where S ′′ ⊆ St\ S˜t is such that |S ′t| = rt.
By irrelevance of rejected students, C(S ′) = C(S). Thus,
fˆ(ξ(S ′))t ≤
∣∣C(S ′)t∣∣ = ∣∣C(S)t∣∣ < rt.
Since ξ(S ′)t = |S ′t| = rt, we obtain a contradiction with the definition of rt above.
Consider the following binary relation. Let s ∗ s′ if there is S, at which {s} =
{s, s′} ∩ C(S) and {s, s′} ⊆ S, and either τ(s) = τ(s′) or τ(s) is saturated at S. By the
adapted strong axiom, ∗ has a linear extension  to S ∪ {∅}.
Third we prove that C is consistent with , as stated in the definition. Let s ∈ C(S)
and s′ ∈ S \ C(S). If τ(s) = τ(s′) then s ∗ s′ by definition of ∗; hence s  s′. If
τ(s) 6= τ(s′) then we need to consider the case when |St| > rt where t = τ(s). The
construction of rt implies that rt = fˆ(|St| , x¯−t) < |St|. Therefore, there exists S ′ ⊆ S
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such that if
S ′ = St ∪
(
∪t˜6=tS t˜
)
then S ′t \ C(S ′)t 6= ∅. Thus t is saturated at S. Since s ∈ C(S) and s′ ∈ S \ C(S), we
get s  s′, as  extends ∗.
It remains to show that if C is generated by soft quotas, then it satisfies the axioms.
It is immediate that it satisfies efficiency, IRS and adapted-SARP.
To see that it satisfies gross substitutes, let S ⊆ S ′ and s ∈ S \C(S). Then ∣∣Sτ(s)∣∣ >
rτ(s), so
∣∣S ′τ(s)∣∣ > rτ(s). Moreover, s ∈ S \ C(S) implies that there are rτ(s) students in
Sτ(s) ranked above s. So s could only be admitted at the second step in the construction
of C. Let C(1)(S) be the set of students that are accepted in the first step, S∗ be the set
of students that are considered in the second step and q∗ be the number of remaining
seats to be allocated in the second step. Again, s ∈ S \ C(S) implies that there are q∗
students ranked above s in S∗. Consider the following procedure for S ′. In the first step
for each t we accept ξ(C(1)(S))t highest ranked students of type t. And in the second
step we consider all remaining students. It is clear that s cannot be admitted in the
first step since S ′τ(s) ⊇ Sτ(s) and that there are at least rτ(s) students ranked above
s ∈ Sτ(s). Moreover, in the second step there are more higher ranked students of each
type compared to S∗, so s can also not be admitted in the second step since there are
only q∗ seats left. If s cannot be admitted with this procedure, then it cannot be in C(S ′)
because for each t 6= τ(s), ξ(C(1)(S))t ≤ rt. Therefore, s ∈ S ′ \ C(S ′).
12 Proofs from Section 6
12.1 Proof of Theorem 6
We start with the following lemma.
Lemma 7. If C satisfies GS and (c, S) blocks a matching µ, then for every s ∈ S \ µ(c)
(c, {s}) ν-blocks µ.
Proof. Since (c, S) blocks µ, we have S ⊆ Cc(µ(c)∪S). Let s ∈ S\µ(c), by substitutability
s ∈ C(µ(c) ∪ S) implies s ∈ C(µ(c) ∪ {s}). Therefore, (c, {s}) blocks µ.
We proceed with the proof of Theorem 6.
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Since we use two different choice rule profiles and stability depends on the choice
rules, we prefix the choice rule profile to stability, individual rationality and no blocking
to avoid confusion. For example, we use C-stability, C-individual rationality and C-no
blocking.
By Theorem 5, DA produces the stable matching that is the best stable matching
for all students simultaneously. Denote the outcome of DA with C and C ′ by µ and µ′,
respectively. Since Cc(µ(c)) = µ(c) by C-individual rationality of µ by every school c,
C ′c(µ(c)) ⊇ Cc(µ(c)) by the assumption, and C ′c(µ(c)) ⊆ µ(c) by definition of the choice
rule we get C ′(µ(c)) = µ(c). Therefore, µ is also C ′-individually rational for schools.
Since student preference profile is fixed, µ is also C ′-individually rational for students.
If µ is a C ′-stable matching, then µ′ Pareto dominates µ since µ′ is the student-optimal
C ′-stable matching. Otherwise, if µ is not a C ′-stable matching, then there exists a C ′-
blocking pair. Whenever there exists such a blocking pair, there also exists a blocking
pair consisting a school and a student by Lemma 7. In such a situation, we apply the
following improvement algorithm. Let µ0 ≡ µ.
Step k Consider blocking pairs involving school ck and students who would like to switch
to ck, say S
k
ck
≡ {s : ck s µk−1(s)}. School ck accepts C ′(µk−1(ck)∪Skck) and rejects
the rest of the students. Let µk(ck) ≡ C ′(µk−1(ck) ∪ Skck) and µk(c) ≡ µk−1(c) for
c 6= ck. If there are no more blocking pairs, then stop and return µk, otherwise go
to Step k + 1.
We first prove by induction that no previously admitted student is ever rejected in
the improvement algorithm. For the base case when k = 1 note that C ′(µ(c1) ∪ S1c1) ⊇
C(µ(c1) ∪ S1c1) by assumption and C(µ(c1) ∪ S1c1) = µ(c1) since µ is C-stable. Therefore,
C ′(µ(c1) ∪ S1c1) ⊇ µ(c1), which implies that no students are rejected at the first stage
of the algorithm. Assume, by mathematical induction hypothesis, that no students are
rejected during Steps 1 through k − 1 of the improvement algorithm. We prove that no
student is rejected at Step k of the algorithm. There are two cases to consider.
First, consider the case when cn 6= ck for all n ≤ k − 1. Since µ is C-stable, we
have C(µ(ck) ∪ Skck) = µ(ck) (as students in Skck prefers ck to their schools in µ). By
assumption, C ′(µ(ck) ∪ Skck) ⊇ C(µ(ck) ∪ Skck) which implies C ′(µ(ck) ∪ Skck) ⊇ µ(ck).
Since µ(ck) ⊇ µk−1(ck) we have C ′(µk−1(ck)∪Skck) ⊇ µk−1(ck) by substitutability. In this
case no student is rejected at Step k.
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Second, consider the case when ck = cn for some n ≤ k − 1. Let n∗ be the last step
smaller than k in which school ck was considered. Since each student’s match is either the
same or improved at Steps 1 through k−1, we have µn∗−1(ck)∪Sn∗ck ⊇ µk−1(ck)∪Skck . By
construction µn
∗
(ck) = C
′(µn
∗−1(ck) ∪ Sn∗ck ) which implies µk−1(ck) ⊆ C ′(µk−1(ck) ∪ Skck)
by substitutability and the fact that µn
∗
(ck) ⊇ µk−1(ck) (since n∗ is the last step before
k in which school ck is considered). Therefore, no student is rejected at Step k.
Since no student is ever rejected by the improvement algorithm, it ends in a finite
number of steps. Moreover, the resulting matching does not have any C ′-blocking pair.
By construction, it is also C ′-individually rational. This shows that there exists a C ′-
stable matching that Pareto dominates µ. Since µ′ is the student-optimal C ′-stable
matching, we have that µ′ Pareto dominates µ for students.
12.2 Proof of Theorem 7
For each school c, let f be defined as in the proof of Theorem 1 for choice rule profile
Cc: such f is well defined because Cc satisfies distribution-dependence. Similarly, let f
i
be the corresponding function in the ideal point model, given ideal point z∗c ; and let f
s
be the f corresponding function in the Schur model, given parameter z∗c .
Let S be a set of students and y ≡ ξ(S) ≤ ξ(S) be the type distribution of S. Then,
by gross substitutes of Cc and Lemma 2 we have that
f i(y) = y ∧ z∗ ≤ f(y).
Moreover,
f(y) ≤ f s(y)
is implied by the fact that f s(y) ∈ ∂MB(y) because (a) if yt ≤ z∗t then f(y)t = f s(y)t, and
(b) if yt > z
∗
t then can choose f
s(y) ∈ ∂MB(y) that max. ν and satisfies f(y)t = f s(y)t.
Since f i(y) ≤ f(y) ≤ f s(y), the conclusion follows from Theorem 6.
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